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Abstract
We consider the noise complexity of differentially private mechanisms in the setting where
the user asks d linear queries f : <n → < non-adaptively. Here, the database is represented by a
vector in <n and proximity between databases is measured in the `1-metric.
We show that the noise complexity is determined by two geometric parameters associated
with the set of queries. We use this connection to give tight upper and lower bounds on the
noise complexity for any d 6 n. We show that for d random linear queries of sensitivity 1, it is
necessary and sufficient to add `2-error Θ(min{d
√
d/ε, d
√
log(n/d)/ε}) to achieve ε-differential
privacy. Assuming the truth of a deep conjecture from convex geometry, known as the Hyperplane
conjecture, we can extend our results to arbitrary linear queries giving nearly matching upper
and lower bounds.
Our bound translates to error O(min{d/ε,√d log(n/d)/ε}) per answer. The best previous
upper bound (Laplacian mechanism) gives a bound of O(min{d/ε,√n/ε}) per answer, while
the best known lower bound was Ω(
√
d/ε). In contrast, our lower bound is strong enough to
separate the concept of differential privacy from the notion of approximate differential privacy
where an upper bound of O(
√
d/ε) can be achieved.
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1 Introduction
The problem of Privacy-preserving data analysis has attracted a lot of attention in recent years.
Several databases, e.g. those held by the Census Bureau, contain private data provided by individuals,
and protecting the privacy of those individuals is an important concern. Differential Privacy is a
rigorous notion of privacy that allows statistical analysis of sensitive data while providing strong
privacy guarantees even in the presence of an adversary armed with arbitrary auxiliary information.
We refer the reader to the survey of Dwork [Dwo08] and the references therein for further motivation
and background information.
We consider the following general setting: A database is represented by a vector x ∈ <n. The
queries that the analyst may ask are linear combinations of the entries of x. More precisely, a
multidimensional query is a map F : <n → <d, and we will restrict ourselves to linear maps F
with coefficients in the interval [−1, 1]. Thus F is a d × n matrix with entries in [−1, 1]. In this
work, we assume throughout that d 6 n. A mechanism is a randomized algorithm which holds a
database x ∈ <n, receives a query F : <n → <d and answers with some a ∈ <d. Informally, we say a
mechanism satisfies differential privacy in this setting if the densities of the output distributions
on inputs x, x′ ∈ <n with ‖x − x′‖1 6 1 are point wise within an exp(ε) multiplicative factor of
each other. Here and in the following, ε > 0 is a parameter that measures the strength of the
privacy guarantee (smaller ε being a stronger guarantee). The error of a mechanism is the expected
Euclidean distance between the correct answer Fx and the actual answer a.
In this work, we use methods from convex geometry to determine a nearly optimal trade-off
between privacy and error. We will see a lower bound on how much error any differentially private
mechanism must add. And we present a mechanism whose error nearly matches this lower bound.
As mentioned, the above setup is fairly general. To illustrate it and facilitate comparison with
previous work, we will describe some specific instantiations below.
Histograms. Suppose we have a database y ∈ [n]N , containing private information about N
individuals. We can think of each individual as belonging to one of n types. The database y can
then naturally be translated to a histogram x ∈ <n, i.e., xi counts the number of individuals of
type i. Note that in the definition of differential privacy, we require the mechanism to be defined
for all x ∈ <n and demand that the output distributions be close whenever ‖x − x′‖1 6 1. This
is a stronger requirement than asserting this property only for integer vectors x and x′. It only
makes our upper bounds stronger. For the lower bounds, this strengthening allows us to ignore the
discretization issues that would arise in the usual definition. However, our lower bounds can be
extended for the usual definition for small enough ε and large enough N (see Appendix B). Now,
our upper bound holds for any linear query on the histogram. This includes some well-studied and
natural classes of queries. For instance, contingency tables (see, e.g., [BCD+07]) are linear queries
on the histogram.
Private bits. In the setting looked at by Dinur and Nissim [DN03], the database y ∈ {0, 1}N
consists of one private bit for each individual and each query ask for the number of 1’s amongst a
(random) subset on [N ]. Given d such queries, one can define n 6 2d types of individuals, depending
on the subset of the queries that ask about an individual. The vector y then maps to a histogram x
in the natural way with xi denoting the number of individuals of type i with their private bit set
to 1. Our results then imply a lower bound of Ω(d/ε) per answer for any ε-differentially private
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mechanism. This improves on the Ω(
√
d) bound for d = N from [DN03] for a weaker privacy
definition (blatant non-privacy). A closely related rephrasing is to imagine each individual having d
private {0, 1} attributes so that n = 2d. The d queries that ask for the 1-way marginals of the input
naturally map to a matrix F and Theorem 1.1 implies a lower bound of Ω(d/ε) noise per marginal
for such queries.
One can also look at x itself as a database where each individuals private data is in [0, 1]; in this
setting the dimension of the data n equals the number of individuals N . Our results lead to better
upper bounds for this setting.
Finally, there are settings such as the recent work of [MM09] on private recommendation systems,
where the private data is transformed with a stability guarantee so that nearby databases get
mapped to vectors at `1 distance at most 1.
1.1 Our results
We relate the noise complexity of differentially private mechanisms to some geometric properties of
the image of the unit `1-ball, denoted Bn1 , when applying the linear mapping F . We will denote the
resulting convex polytope by K = FBn1 . Our first result lower bounds the noise any ε-differentially
private mechanism must add in terms of the volume of K.
Theorem 1.1. Let ε > 0 and suppose F : <n → <d is a linear map. Then, every ε-private
mechanism M has error at least Ω(ε−1d
√
d ·Vol(K)1/d) where K = FBn1 .
Recall, the term error refers to the expected Euclidean distance between the output of the
mechanism and the correct answer to the query F .
We then describe a differentially private mechanism whose error depends on the expected `2
norm of a randomly chosen point in K. Our mechanism is an instantiation of the exponential
mechanism [MT07] with the score function defined by the (negative of the) norm ‖ · ‖K , that is
the norm which has K as its unit ball. Hence, we will refer to this mechanism as the K-norm
mechanism. Note that as the definition of this norm depends on the query F, so does the output of
our mechanism.
Theorem 1.2. Let ε > 0 and suppose F : <n → <d is a linear map with K = FBn1 . Then, the
K-norm mechanism is ε-differentially private and has error at most O(ε−1dEz∈K ‖z‖2).
As it turns out, when F is a random Bernoulli ±1 matrix our upper bound matches the lower
bound up to constant factors. In this case, K is a random polytope and its volume and average
Euclidean norm have been determined rather recently. Specifically, we apply a volume lower bound
of Litvak et al. [LPRN05], and an upper bound on the average Euclidean norm due to Klartag and
Kozma [KK09]. Quantitatively, we obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 1.3. Let ε > 0 and d 6 n/2. Then, for almost all matrices F ∈ {−1, 1}d×n,
1. any ε-differentially private mechanism M has error Ω(d/ε) ·min{√d,√log(n/d)}.
2. the K-norm mechanism is ε-differentially private with error O(d/ε) ·min{√d,√log(n/d)}.
We remark that Litvak et al. also give an explicit construction of a mapping F realizing the
lower bound.
More generally, we can relate our upper and lower bounds whenever the body K is in approx-
imately isotropic position. Informally, this condition implies that Ez∈K ‖z‖ ∼
√
d · Vol(K)1/dLK .
Here, LK denotes the so-called isotropic constant which is defined in Section 6.
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Mechanism `2-error privacy reference
Laplacian noise ε−1d
√
d ε [DMNS06]
K-norm ε−1d
√
log(n/d) ε this paper
lower bound Ω(ε−1d) (ε, δ) [DN03]
lower bound Ω(ε−1d) min{√log(n/d,√d} ε this paper
Figure 1: Summary of results in comparison to best previous work for d random linear queries each
of sensitivity 1 where 1 6 d 6 n. Note that informally the average per coordinate error is smaller than the
stated bounds by a factor of
√
d. Here, (ε, δ)-differential privacy refers to a weaker approximate notion of pricacy
introduced later. Our lower bound does not apply to this notion.
Theorem 1.4. Let ε > 0 and suppose F : <n → <d is a linear map such that K = FBn1 is in
approximately isotropic position. Then, the K-norm mechanism is ε-differentially private with error
at most O(ε−1d
√
d ·Vol(K)1/dLK), where LK denotes the isotropic constant of K.
Notice that the bound in the previous theorem differs from the lower bound by a factor of LK .
A central conjecture in convex geometry, sometimes referred to as the “Hyperplane Conjecture” or
“Slicing Conjecture” (see [KK09] for further information) states that LK = O(1).
Unfortunately, in general the polytope K could be very far from isotropic. In this case, both
our volume-based lower bound and the K-norm mechanism can be quite far from optimal. We give
a recursive variant of our mechanism and a natural generalization of our volume-based lower bound
which are nearly optimal even if K is non-isotropic.
Theorem 1.5. Let ε > 0. Suppose F : <n → <d is a linear map. Further, assume the Hyperplane
Conjecture. Then, the mechanism introduced in Section 7 is ε-differentially private and has error at
most O(log3/2 d) ·GVolLB(K, ε). where GVolLB(K, ε) is a lower bound on the error of the optimal
ε-differentially private mechanism.
While we restricted our theorems to F ∈ [−1, 1]d×n, they apply more generally to any linear
mapping F.
Efficient Mechanisms. Our mechanism is an instantiation of the exponential mechanism and
involves sampling random points from rather general high-dimensional convex bodies. This is why
our mechanism is not efficient as it is. However, we can use rapidly mixing geometric random walks
for the sampling step. These random walks turn out to approach the uniform distribution in a
metric that is strong enough for our purposes. It will follow that both of our mechanisms can be
implemented in polynomial time.
Theorem 1.6. The mechanisms given in Theorem 1.2 and Theorem 1.5 can be implemented in
time polynomial in n, 1/ε such that the stated error bound remains the same up to constant factors,
and the mechanism achieves ε-differential privacy.
We note that our lower bound GVolLB can also be approximated up to a constant factor.
Together these results give polynomial time computable upper and lower bounds on the error of any
differentially private mechanism, that are always within an O(log3/2 d) of each other.
Figure 1.1 summarizes our results. Note that we state our bounds in terms of the total `2 error,
which informally is a
√
d factor larger than the average per coordinate error.
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1.2 Previous Work
Queries of the kind described above have (total) sensitivity d, and hence the work of Dwork et
al. [DMNS06] shows that adding Laplace noise with parameter d/ε to each entry of Fx ensures
ε-differential privacy. Moreover, adding Laplace noise to the histogram x itself leads to another
private mechanism. Thus such questions can be answered with noise min(d/ε,
√
n/ε,N) per entry
of Fx. Some specific classes of queries can be answered with smaller error. Nissim, Raskhodnikova
and Smith [NRS07] show that one can add noise proportional to a smoothed version of the local
sensitivity of the query, which can be much smaller than the global sensitivity for some non-linear
queries. Blum, Ligett and Roth [BLR08] show that it is possible to release approximate counts for all
concepts in a concept class C on {0, 1}m with error O((N2mVCDim(C)/ε) 13 ), where VCDim(C) is
the VC dimension of the concept class. Their bounds are incomparable to ours, and in particular their
improvements over the Laplacian mechanism kick in when the number of queries is larger than the
size of the database (a range of parameters we do not consider). Feldman et al. [FFKN09] construct
private core sets for the k-median problem, enabling approximate computation of the k-median cost
of any set of k facilities in <d. Private mechanisms with small error, for other classes of queries have
also been studied in several other works, see e.g. [BDMN05, BCD+07, MT07, CM08, GLM+10].
Dinur and Nissim [DN03] initiated the study of lower bounds on the amount of noise private
mechanisms must add. They showed that any private mechanism that answers O˜(N) random subset
sum queries about a set of N people each having a private bit must add noise Ω(
√
N) to avoid nearly
full disclosure of the database (blatant non-privacy). This implies that as one answers more and
more questions, the amount of error needed per answer must grow to provide any kind of privacy
guarantee. These results were strengthened by Dwork, McSherry and Talwar [DMT07], and by
Dwork and Yekhanin [DY08]. However all these lower bounds protect against blatant non-privacy
and cannot go beyond noise larger than min(
√
d,
√
N) per answer, for d queries. Kasiviswanathan,
Rudelson and Smith [KRS09] show lower bounds of the same nature (min(
√
d,
√
N) for d questions)
for a more natural and useful class of questions. Their lower bounds also apply to (ε, δ)-differential
privacy and are tight when ε and δ are constant. For the case of d = 1, Ghosh, Roughgarden
and Sundararajan [GRS09] show that adding Laplace noise is in fact optimal in a very general
decision-theoretic framework, for any symmetric decreasing loss function. For the case that all
sum queries need to be answered (i.e. all queries of the form fP (y) =
∑N
i=1 P (yi) where P is a
0-1 predicate), Dwork et al. [DMNS06] show that any differentially private mechanism must add
noise Ω(N). Rastogi et al. [RSH07] show that half of such queries must have error Ω(
√
N). Blum,
Ligett and Roth [BLR08] show that any differentially private mechanism answering all (real-valued)
halfspace queries must add noise Ω(N).
1.3 Overview and organization of the paper
In this section we will give a broad overview of our proof and outline the remainder of the paper.
Section 2 contains some preliminary facts and definitions. Specifically, we describe a linear
program that defines the optimal mechanism for any set of queries. This linear program (also
studied in [GRS09] for the one-dimensional case) is exponential in size, but in principle, given any
query and error function, can be used to compute the best mechanism for the given set of queries.
Moreover, dual solutions to this linear program can be used to prove lower bounds on the error.
However, the asymptotic behavior of the optimum value of these programs for multi-dimensional
queries was not understood prior to this work. Our lower bounds can be reinterpreted as dual
5
solutions to the linear program. The upper bounds give near optimal primal solutions. Also, our
results lead to a polynomial-time approximation algorithm for the optimum when F is linear.
We prove our lower bound in Section 3. Given a query F : <d → <d, our lower bound depends on
the d-dimensional volume of K = FBn1 . If the volume of K is large, then a packing argument shows
that we can pack exponentially many points inside K so that each pair of points is far from each
other. We then scale up K by a suitable factor λ. By linearity, all points within λK have preimages
under F that are still λ-close in `1-distance. Hence, the definition of ε-differential privacy (by
transitivity) enforces some constraint between these preimages. We can combine these observations
so as to show that any differentially private mechanism M will have to put significant probability
mass in exponentially many disjoint balls. This forces the mechanism to have large expected error.
We then introduce the K-norm mechanism in Section 4. Our mechanism computes Fx and
then adds a noise vector to Fx. The key point here is that the noise vector is not independent of
F as in previous works. Instead, informally speaking, the noise is tailored to the exact shape of
K = FBn1 . This is accomplished by picking a particular noise vector a with probability proportional
to exp(−ε‖Fx − a‖K). Here, ‖ · ‖K denotes the (Minkowski) norm defined by K. While our
mechanism depends upon the query F , it does not depend on the particular database x. We can
analyze our mechanism in terms of the expected Euclidean distance from the origin of a random
point in K, i.e., Ez∈K ‖z‖2. Arguing optimality of our mechanism hence boils down to relating
Ez∈K ‖z‖2 to the volume of K which is the goal of the next section.
Indeed, using several results from convex geometry, we observe that our lower and upper bounds
match up to constant factors when F is drawn at random from {−1, 1}d×n. As it turns out the
polytope K can be interpreted as the symmetric convex hull of the row vectors of F. When F is a
random matrix, K is a well-studied random polytope. Some recent results on random polytopes give
us suitable lower bounds on the volume and upper bounds on the average Euclidean norm. More
generally, our bounds are tight whenever K is in isotropic position (as pointed out in Section 6).
This condition intuitively gives a relation between volume and average distance from the origin.
Our bounds are actually only tight up to a factor of LK , the isotropic constant of K. A well-known
conjecture from convex geometry, known as the Hyperplane Conjecture or Slicing Conjecture, implies
that LK = O(1).
The problem is that when F is not drawn at random, K could be very far from isotropic. In
this case, the K-norm mechanism by itself might actually perform poorly. We thus give a recursive
variant of the K-norm mechanism in Section 7 which can handle non-isotropic bodies. Our approach
is based on analyzing the covariance matrix of K in order to partition K into parts on which our
earlier mechanism performs well. Assuming the Hyperplane conjecture, we derive bounds on the
error of our mechanism that are optimal to within polylogarithmic factors.
The costly step in both of our mechanisms is sampling uniformly from high-dimensional convex
bodies such as K = FBn1 . To implement the sampling step efficiently, we will use geometric random
walks. It can be shown that these random walks approach the uniform distribution over K in
polynomial time. We will actually need convergence bounds in the relative `∞-metric, a metric strong
enough to entail guarantees about exact differential privacy rather than approximate differential
privacy (to be introduced later).
Some complications arise, since we need to repeat the privacy and optimality analysis of our
mechanisms in the presence of approximation errors (such as an approximate covariance matrix and
an approximate separation oracle for K). The details can be found in Section 8.
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2 Preliminaries
Notation. We will write Bdp to denote the unit ball of the p-norm in <d. When K ⊆ <d is
a centrally symmetric convex set, we write ‖ · ‖K for the (Minkowski) norm defined by K (i.e.
‖x‖K = inf{r : x ∈ rK}). The `p-norms are denoted by ‖ · ‖p, but we use ‖ · ‖ as a shorthand for
the Euclidean norm ‖ · ‖2. Given a function F : <d1 → <d2 and a set K ∈ <d1 , FK denotes the
set {F (x) : x ∈ K}.
2.1 Differential Privacy
Definition 2.1. A mechanism M is a family of probability measures M = {µx : x ∈ <n} where each
measure µx is defined on <d. A mechanism is called ε-differentially private, if for all x, y ∈ <n such
that ‖x− y‖1 6 1, we have supS⊆<d µx(S)µy(S) 6 exp(ε), where the supremum runs over all measurable
subsets S ⊆ <d.
A common weakening of ε-differential privacy is the following notion of approximate privacy.
Definition 2.2. A mechanism is called δ-approximate ε-differentially private, if for all x, y ∈ <n
such that µx(S) 6 exp(ε)µy(S) + δ for all measurable subsets S ⊆ <n whenever‖x− y‖1 6 1,
The definition of privacy is transitive in the following sense.
Fact 2.3. If M is an ε-differentially private mechanism and x, y ∈ <n satisfy ‖x− y‖1 6 k, then
for measurable S ⊆ <d we have µx(S)µy(S) 6 exp(εk).
Definition 2.4 (Error). Let F : <n → <d and ` : <d × <d → <+. We define the `-error of a
mechanism M as err`(M,F ) = supx∈<n Ea∼µx `(a, Fx). Unless otherwise specified, we take ` to be
the Euclidean norm `2.
Definition 2.5 (Sensitivity). We will consider mappings F which possess the Lipschitz property,
supx∈Bn1 ‖Fx‖1 6 d. In this case, we will say that F has sensitivity d.
Our goal is to show trade-offs between privacy and error. The following standard upper bound,
usually called the Laplacian mechanism, is known.
Theorem 2.6 ([DMNS06]). For any mapping F : <n → <d of sensitivity d and any ε > 0, there
exists an ε-differentially private mechanism M with err(M,F ) = O(d
√
d/ε).
When it comes to approximate privacy, the so-called Gaussian mechanism provides the following
guarantee.
Theorem 2.7 ([DKM+06]). Let ε, δ > 0. Then, for any mapping F : <n → <d of sensitivity d there
exists a δ-approximate ε-differentially private mechanism M with err(M,F ) = O(d
√
log(1/δ)/ε).
7
2.2 Isotropic Position
Definition 2.8 (Isotropic Position). We say a convex body K ⊆ <d is in isotropic position with
isotropic constant LK if for every unit vector v ∈ <d,
1
Vol(K)
∫
K
|〈z, v〉|2dz = L2KVol(K)2/d . (1)
Fact 2.9. For every convex body K ⊆ <d, there is a volume-preserving linear transformation T
such that TK is in isotropic position.
For an arbitrary convex body K, its isotropic constant LK can then be defined to be LTK where
T brings L to isotropic position. It is known (e.g. [MP89]) that T is unique up to an orthogonal
transformation and thus this is well-defined.
We refer the reader to the paper of Milman and Pajor [MP89], as well as the extensive survey of
Giannopoulos [Gia03] for a proof of this fact and other facts regarding the isotropic constant.
2.3 Gamma Distribution
The Gamma distribution with shape parameter k > 0 and scale θ > 0, denoted Gamma(k, θ), is
given by the probability density function
f(r; k, θ) = rk−1
e−r/θ
Γ(k)θk
.
Here, Γ(k) =
∫
e−rrk−1dr denotes the Gamma function. We will need an expression for the moments
of the Gamma distribution.
Fact 2.10. Let r ∼ Gamma(k, θ). Then,
E [rm] =
θmΓ(k +m)
Γ(k)
. (2)
Proof.
E [rm] =
∫
<
rk+m−1
e−r/θ
Γ(k)θk
dr =
1
Γ(k)θk
∫
<
(θr)k+m−1e−rdθr
=
Γ(k +m)θk+m
Γ(k)θk
=
Γ(k +m)θm
Γ(k)

2.4 Linear Programming Characterization
Suppose that the set of databases is given by some set D, and let dist : D ×D → <0 be a distance
function on D. A query q is specified by an error function err : D×R → <. For example D could be
the Hamming cube {0, 1}N with dist being the Hamming distance. Given a query F : {0, 1}N → <d,
the error function could be err(x, a) = ‖a − F (x)‖2 if we wish to compute F (x) up to a small `2
error.
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A mechanism is specified by a distribution µx on R for every x ∈ D. Assume for simplicity that
D and R are both finite. Thus a mechanism is fully defined by real numbers µ(x, a), where µ(x, a)
is the probability that the mechanism outputs answer a ∈ R on databases x ∈ D. The constraints
on µ for an ε-differentially private mechanism are given by∑
a∈R
µ(x, a) = 1 ∀x ∈ D
µ(x, a) > 0 ∀x ∈ D, a ∈ R
µ(x, a) 6 exp(εdist(x, x′))µ(x′, a) ∀x, x′ ∈ D, a ∈ R
The expected error (under any given prior over databases) is then a linear function of the
variables µ(x, a) and can be optimized. Similarly, the worse case (over databases) expected error
can be minimized, and we will concentrate on this measure for the rest of the paper. However these
linear programs can be prohibitive in size. Moreover, it is not a priori clear how one can use this
formulation to understand the asymptotic behavior of the error of the optimum mechanism.
Our work leads to a constant approximation to the optimum of this linear program when F is a
random in {−1,+1}d×n and an O(log3/2 d)-approximation otherwise.
3 Lower bounds via volume estimates
In this section we show that lower bounds on the volume of the convex body FBn1 ⊆ <d give rise to
lower bounds on the error that any private mechanism must have with respect to F .
Definition 3.1. A set of points Y ⊆ <d is called a r-packing if ‖y−y′‖2 > r for any y, y′ ∈ Y, y 6= y′.
Fact 3.2. Let K ⊆ <d such that R = Vol(K)1/d. Then, K contains an Ω(R√d)-packing of size at
least exp(d).
Proof. Since Vol(Bd2)
1/d ∼ 1√
d
, the body K has the volume of a ball of radius r ∈ Ω(R√d). Any
maximal r4 -packing then has the desired property. 
Theorem 3.3. Let ε > 0 and suppose F : <n → <d is a linear map and let K = FBn1 . Then, every
ε-differentially private mechanism M must have err(M,F ) > Ω(ε−1d
√
d ·Vol(K)1/d).
Proof. Let λ > 1 be some scalar and put R = Vol(K)1/d. By Fact 3.2 and our assumption,
λK = λFBn1 contains an Ω(λR
√
d)-packing Y of size at least exp(d). Let X ⊆ <n be a set of
arbitrarily chosen preimages of y ∈ Y so that |X| = |Y | and FX = Y . By linearity, λFBn1 = F (λBn1 )
and hence we may assume that every x ∈ X satisfies ‖x‖1 6 λ.
We will now assume that M = {µx : x ∈ <n} is an ε-differentially private mechanism with error
cd
√
dR/ε and lead this to a contradiction for small enough c > 0. For this we set λ = d/2ε. By the
assumption on the error, Markov’s inequality implies that for all x ∈ X, we have µx(Bx) > 12 , where
Bx is a ball of radius 2cd
√
dR/ε = 4cλR
√
d centered at Fx. Since Y = FX is an Ω(λR
√
d)-packing,
the balls {Bx : x ∈ X} are disjoint for small enough constant c > 0.
Since ‖x‖1 6 λ, it follows from ε-differential privacy with Fact 2.3 that
µ0(Bx) > exp(−ελ)µx(Bx) > 12 exp(−d/2).
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Since the balls Bx are pairwise disjoint,
1 > µ0(∪x∈XBx) =
∑
x∈X
µ0(Bx) > exp(d)12 exp(−d/2) > 1 (3)
for d > 2. We have thus obtained a contradiction. 
We denote by VolLB(F, ε)) the lower bound resulting from the above theorem. In other words
VolLB(F, ε) = ε−1d
√
d ·Vol(FBn1 )1/d.
Thus any ε-differentially private mechanism must add noise Ω(VolLB(K, ε)). We will later need
the following modification of the previous argument which gives a lower bound in the case where
K is close to a lower dimensional subspace and hence the volume inside this subspace may give a
stronger lower bound.
Corollary 3.4. Let ε > 0 and suppose F : <n → <d is a linear map and let K = FBn1 . Furthermore,
let P denote the orthogonal projection operator of a k-dimensional subspace of <d for some 1 6 k 6 d.
Then, every ε-differentially private mechanism M must have
err(M,F ) > Ω(ε−1k
√
k ·Volk(PK)1/k). (4)
Proof. Note that a differentially private answer a to F can be projected down to a (differentially
private) answer Pa to PF and P is norm 1 operator. 
We will denote by GVolLB(F, ε) the best lower bound obtainable in this manner, i.e.,
GVolLB(F, ε) = sup
k,P
ε−1k
√
k ·Volk(PFBn1 )1/k
where the supremum is taken over all k and all k-dimensional orthogonal projections P .
Lower bounds in the Hamming metric. Our lower bound used the fact that the mechanism is
defined on all vectors x ∈ <d. In Appendix B, we show how the lower bound can be extended when
restricting the domain of the mechanism to integer vectors x ∈ [N ]n, where distance is measured in
the Hamming metric.
3.1 Lower bounds for small number of queries
As shown previously, the task of proving lower bounds on the error of private mechanisms reduces
to analyzing the volume of FBn1 . When d 6 log n this is a straightforward task.
Fact 3.5. Let d 6 log n. Then, for all matrices F ∈ [−1, 1]d×n, Vol(FBn1 )1/d 6 O(1). Furthermore,
there is an explicit matrix F such that FBn1 has maximum volume.
Proof. Clearly, FBn1 is always contained in B
d∞ and Vol(Bd∞)1/d = 2. On the other hand, since
n > 2d, we may take F to contain all points of the hypercube H = {±1}d as its columns. In this
case, FBn1 ⊇ Bd∞. 
This lower bound shows that the standard upper bound from Theorem 2.6 is, in fact, optimal
when d 6 log(n).
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KM(F, d, ε) :
1. Sample z uniformly at random from K = FBn1 and sample r ∼ Gamma(d+ 1, ε−1).
2. Output Fx+ rz.
Figure 2: Description of the d-dimensional K-norm mechanism.
4 The K-norm mechanism
In this section we describe a new differentially private mechanism, which we call the K-norm
mechanism.
Definition 4.1 (K-norm mechanism). Given a linear map F : <n → <d and ε > 0, we let K = FBn1
and define the mechanism KM(F, d, ε) = {µx : x ∈ <n} so that each measure µx is given by the
probability density function
f(a) = Z−1 exp(−ε‖Fx− a‖K) (5)
defined over <d. Here Z denotes the normalization constant
Z =
∫
<d
exp(−ε‖Fx− a‖K)da = Γ(d+ 1)Vol(ε−1K).
A more concrete view of the mechanism is provided by Figure 4 and justified in the next remark.
Remark 4.2. We can sample from the distribution µx as follows:
1. Sample r from the Gamma distribution with parameter d+1 and scale ε−1, denoted Gamma(d+
1, ε−1). That is, r is distributed as
Pr(r > R) =
1
ε−dΓ(d+ 1)
∫ ∞
R
e−εttddt.
2. Sample a uniformly from Fx+ rK.
Indeed, if ‖a − Fx‖K = R, then the distribution of a as above follows the probability density
function
g(a) =
1
ε−dΓ(d+ 1)
∫ ∞
R
e−εttd
Vol(tK)
dt =
∫∞
R e
−εtdt
Γ(d+ 1)Vol(ε−1K)
=
e−εR
Γ(d+ 1)Vol(ε−1K)
, (6)
which is in agreement with (5). That is, g(a) = f(a).
The next theorem shows that the K-norm mechanism is indeed differentially private. Moreover,
we can express its error in terms of the expected distance from the origin of a random point in K.
Theorem 4.3. Let ε > 0. Suppose F : <n → <d is a linear map and put K = FBn1 . Then, the
mechanism KM(F, d, ε) is ε-differentially private, and for every p > 0 achieves the error bound
Ea∼µx ‖Fx− a‖p 6 Γ(d+1+p)εpΓ(d) Ez∈K ‖z‖p2. In particular, the `2-error is at most d+1ε Ez∈K ‖z‖2.
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Proof. To argue the error bound, we will follow Remark 4.2. Let D = Gamma(d + 1, 1/ε). For
all x ∈ <n,
E
a∼µx
‖Fx− a‖p = E
a∼µ0
‖a‖p = E
r∼D
E
a∈rK
‖a‖p =
[
E
r∼D
rp
]
E
z∈K
‖z‖p
=
Γ(d+ 1 + p)
εpΓ(d+ 1)
E
z∈K
‖z‖p. (by Fact (2.10))
When p = 1, Γ(d+1+p)Γ(d+1) = d+ 1.
Privacy follows from the fact that the mechanism is a special case of the exponential mecha-
nism [MT07]. For completeness, we repeat the argument.
Suppose that ‖x‖1 6 1. It suffices to show that for all a ∈ <d, the densities of µ0 and µx are
within multiplicative exp(ε), i.e.,
Z−1e−ε‖a‖K
Z−1e−ε‖Fx−a‖K
= eε(‖Fx−a‖K−‖a‖K) 6 eε‖Fx‖K 6 eε.
where in the first inequality we used the triangle inequality for ‖ · ‖K . In the second step we used
that x ∈ Bn1 and hence Fx ∈ FBn1 = K which means ‖Fx‖K 6 1.
Hence, the mechanism satisfies ε-differential privacy. 
5 Matching bounds for random queries
In this section, we will show that our upper bound matches our lower bound when F is a random query.
A key observation is that FBn1 is the symmetric convex hull of n (random) points {v1, . . . , vn} ⊆ <d,
i.e., the convex hull of {±v1, . . . ,±vn}, where vi ∈ <d is the ith column of F . The symmetric convex
hull of random points has been studied extensively in the theory of random polytopes. A recent
result of Litvak, Pajor, Rudelson and Tomczak-Jaegermann [LPRN05] gives the following lower
bound on the volume of the convex hull.
Theorem 5.1 ([LPRN05]). Let 2d 6 n 6 2d and let F denote a random d× n Bernoulli matrix.
Then,
Vol(FBn1 )
1/d > Ω(1)
√
log(n/d)/d , (7)
with probability 1−exp(−Ω(dβn1−β)) for any β ∈ (0, 12). Furthermore, there is an explicit construction
of n points in {−1, 1}d whose convex hull achieves the same volume.
We are mostly interested in the range where n d log d in which case the theorem was already
proved by Giannopoulos and Hartzoulaki [GH02] (up to a weaker bound in the probability and
without the explicit construction).
The bound in (7) is tight up to constant factors. A well known result [BF88] shows that the
volume of the convex hull of any n points on the sphere in <d of radius √d is bounded by
Vol(K)1/d 6 O(1)
√
log(n/d)/d . (8)
Notice, that in our case K = FBn1 ⊆ Bd∞ ⊆
√
dBd2 and in fact the vertices of K are points on the
(d− 1)-dimensional sphere of radius √d. However, equation (7) states that the normalized volume of
the random polytope K will be proportional to the volume of the Euclidean ball of radius
√
log(n/d)
12
rather than
√
d. When d log n, this means that the volume of K will be tiny compared to the
volume of the infinity ball Bd∞. By combining the volume lower bound with Theorem 3.3, we get
the following lower bound on the error of private mechanisms.
Theorem 5.2. Let ε > 0 and 0 < d 6 n/2. Then, for almost all matrices F ∈ {−1, 1}d×n, every
ε-differentially private mechanism M must have
err(M,F ) > Ω(d/ε) ·min
{√
d,
√
log(n/d)
}
. (9)
5.1 A separation result.
We use this paragraph to point out that our lower bound immediately implies a separation between
approximate and exact differential privacy.
Theorem 2.7 gives a mechanism providing δ-approximate ε-differential privacy with error
o(ε−1
√
log(n/d)) as long as δ > 1/no(1). Our lower bound in Theorem 5.2 on the other hand
states that the error of any ε-differentially private mechanism must be Ω(ε−1
√
log(n/d)) (assuming
d log(n)). We get the strongest separation when d 6 log(n) and δ is constant. In this case, our
lower bound is a factor
√
d larger than the upper bound for approximate differential privacy.
5.2 Upper bound on average Euclidean norm
Klartag and Kozma [KK09] recently gave a bound on the quantity Ez∼K ‖z‖ when K = FBn1 for
random F.
Theorem 5.3 ([KK09]). Let F be a random d × n Bernoulli matrix and put K = FBn1 . Then,
there is a constant C > 0 so that with probability greater than 1− Ce−O(n),
1
Vol(K)
∫
z∈K
‖z‖2dz 6 C log(n/d). (10)
An application of Jensen’s inequality thus gives us the following corollary.
Corollary 5.4. Let ε > 0 and 0 < d 6 n/2. Then, for almost all matrices F ∈ {−1, 1}d×n, the
mechanism KM(F, d, ε) is ε-differentially private with error at most
O(d/ε) ·min
{√
d,
√
log(n/d)
}
. (11)
6 Approximately isotropic bodies
The following definition is a relaxation of nearly isotropic position used in literature (e.g., [KLS97])
Definition 6.1 (Approximately Isotropic Position). We say a convex body K ⊆ <d is in c-
approximately isotropic position if for every unit vector v ∈ <d,
1
Vol(K)
∫
K
|〈z, v〉|2dz 6 c2L2KVol(K)
2
d . (12)
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The results of Klartag and Kozma [KK09] referred to in the previous section show that the
symmetric convex hull n random points from the d-dimensional hypercube are in O(1)-approximately
isotropic position and have LK = O(1). More generally, the K-norm mechanism can be shown to
be approximately optimal whenever K is nearly isotropic.
Theorem 6.2 (Theorem 1.2 restated). Let ε > 0. Suppose F : <n → <d is a linear map such that
K = FBn1 is in c-approximately isotropic position. Then, the K-norm mechanism is ε-differentially
private and has error at most O(cLK) ·VolLB(F, ε).
Proof. By Theorem 4.3, the K-norm mechanism is ε-differentially private and has error
d+1
ε Ez∼K ‖z‖. By the definition of the approximately isotropic position, we have: Ez∼K ‖z‖2 6
d · c2L2KVol(K)2/d. By Jensen’s inequality,
d+ 1
ε
E
z∼K
‖z‖ 6 d+ 1
ε
√
E
z∼K
‖z‖2 6 O(ε−1d
√
d ·Vol(K)1/dcLK).
Plugging in the definition of VolLB proves the result. 
We can see that the previous upper bound is tight up to a factor of cLK . Estimating LK for
general convex bodies is a well-known open problem in convex geometry. The best known upper
bound for a general convex body K ⊆ <d is LK 6 O(d1/4) due to Klartag [Kla06], improving over
the estimate LK 6 O(d1/4 log d) of Bourgain from ’91. The conjecture is that LK = O(1).
Conjecture 6.3 (Hyperplane Conjecture). There exists C > 0 such that for every d and every
convex set K ⊆ <d, LK < C.
Assuming this conjecture we get matching bounds for approximately isotropic convex bodies.
Theorem 6.4. Let ε > 0. Assuming the hyperplane conjecture, for every F ∈ [−1, 1]d×n such
that K = FBn1 is c-approximately isotropic, the K-norm mechanism KM(F, d, ε) is ε-differentially
private with error at most
O(c) ·VolLB(F, ε) 6 O(cd/ε) ·min
{√
d,
√
log(n/d)
}
. (13)
7 Non-isotropic bodies
While the mechanism of the previous sections is near-optimal for near-isotropic queries, it can be far
from optimal if K is far from isotropic. For example, suppose the matrix F has random entries from
{+1,−1} in the first row, and (say) from { 1
d2
,− 1
d2
} in the remaining rows. While the Laplacian
mechanism will add O(1ε ) noise to the first co-ordinate of Fx, the K-norm mechanism will add noise
O(d/ε) to the first co-ordinate. Moreover, the volume lower bound VolLB is at most O(ε−1
√
d).
Rotating F by a random rotation gives, w.h.p., a query for which the Laplacian mechanism adds `2
error O(d/ε). For such a body, the Laplacian and the K-norm mechanisms, as well as the VolLB
are far from optimal.
In this section, we will design a recursive mechanism that can handle such non-isotropic convex
bodies. To this end, we will need to introduce a few more notions from convex geometry.
Suppose K ⊆ <d is a centered convex body, i.e. ∫K xdx = 0. The covariance matrix of K,
denoted MK is the d× d matrix with entry ij equal to Mij = 1Vol(K)
∫
K xixjdx. That is, MK is the
covariance matrix of the uniform distribution over K.
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NIM(F, d, ε) :
1. Let K = FBn1 . Let σ1 > σ2 > . . . > σd denote the eigenvalues of the covariance
matrix MK . Pick a corresponding orthonormal eigenbasis u1, . . . , ud.
2. Let d′ = bd/2c and let U = span{u1, . . . , ud′} and V = span{ud′+1, . . . , vd}.
3. Sample a ∼ KM(F, d, ε) .
4. If d = 1, output PV a. Otherwise, output NIM(PUF, d′, ε) + PV a .
Figure 3: Mechanism for non-isotropic bodies
7.1 A recursive mechanism
Having defined the covariance matrix, we can describe a recursive mechanism for the case when K
is not in isotropic position. The idea of the mechanism is to act differently on different eigenspaces
of the covariance matrix. Specifically, the mechanism will use a lower-dimensional version of
KM(F, d′, ε) on subspaces corresponding to few large eigenvalues.
Our mechanism, called NIM(F, d, ε), is given a linear mapping F : <n → <d, and parameters
d ∈ N, ε > 0. The mechanism proceeds recursively by partitioning the convex body K into two
parts defined by the middle eigenvalue of MK . On one part it will act according to the K-norm
mechanism. On the other part, it will descend recursively. The mechanism is described in Figure 7.1
Remark 7.1. The image of PUF above is a d′-dimensional subspace of <d. We assume that in
the recursive call NIM(PUF, d′, ε), the K-norm mechanism is applied to a basis of this subspace.
However, formally the output is a d-dimensional vector.
To analyze our mechanism, first observe that the recursive calls terminate after at most log d
steps. For each recursive step m ∈ {0, . . . , log d}, let am denote the distribution over the output of
the Km-norm mechanism in step 3. Here, Km denotes the dm-dimensional body given in step m.
Lemma 7.2. The mechanism NIM(F, d, ε) satisfies (ε log d)-differential privacy.
Proof. We claim that for every step m ∈ {0, . . . , log d}, the distribution over am is ε-differentially
private. Notice that this claim implies the lemma, since the joint distribution of a0, a1, . . . , am is
ε log(d)-differentially private. In particular, this is true for the final output of the mechanism as it
is a function of a0, . . . , am.
To see why the claim is true, observe that each Km is the dm-dimensional image of the `1-ball
under a linear mapping. Hence, the Km-norm mechanism guarantees ε-differential privacy by
Theorem 4.3. 
The error analysis of our mechanism requires more work. In particular, we need to understand
how the volume of PUK compares to the norm of PV a. As a first step we will analyze the volume
of PUK.
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7.2 Volume in eigenspaces of the covariance matrix
Our goal in this section is to express the volume of K in eigenspaces of the covariance matrix
in terms of the eigenvalues of the covariance matrix. This will be needed in the analysis of our
mechanism for non-isotropic bodies.
We start with a formula for the volume of central sections of isotropic bodies. This result can
be found in [MP89].
Proposition 7.3. Let K ⊆ <d be an isotropic body of unit volume. Let E denote a k-dimensional
subspace for 1 6 k 6 d. Then,
Volk(E ∩K)1/(d−k) = Θ
(
LBK
LK
)
.
Here, BK is an explicitly defined isotropic convex body.
From here on, for an isotropic body K, let αK = Ω(LBK/LK) be a lower bound on Volk(E ∩
K)1/(d−k) implied by the above proposition. For a non-isotropic K, let αK be αTK when T is the
map the brings K into isotropic position. Notice that if the Hyperplane Conjecture is true, then
αK = Ω(1). Moreover, αK is Ω(d
1
4 ) due to the results of [Kla06].
Corollary 7.4. Let K ⊆ <d be an isotropic body with Vol(K) = 1. Let E denote a k-dimensional
subspace for 1 6 k 6 d and let P denote an orthogonal projection operator onto the subspace E.
Then,
Volk(PK)1/(d−k) > αK .
Proof. Observe that the PK contains E ∩K since P is the identity on E. 
We cannot immediately use these results since they only apply to isotropic bodies and we
are specifically dealing with non-isotropic bodies. The trick is to apply the previous results after
transforming K into an isotropic body while keeping track how much this transformation changed
the volume.
As a first step, the following lemma relates the volume of projections of an arbitrary convex
body K to the volume of projections of TK for some linear mapping T .
Lemma 7.5. Let K ⊆ <d be a symmetric convex body. Let T be a linear map which has eigenvectors
u1, . . . , ud with eigenvalues λ1, . . . , λd. Let 1 6 k 6 d and suppose E = span{u1, u2, . . . , uk}, Denote
by P be the projection operator onto the subspace E. Then,
Volk(PK) > Volk(PTK)
k∏
i=1
λ−1i .
Proof. For simplicity, we assume that the eigenvectors of T are the standard basis vectors e1, . . . , ed;
this is easily achieved by applying a rotation to K. Now, it is easy to verify that P = PT−1T = SPT
where S = diag(λ−11 , λ
−1
2 , . . . , λ
−1
k , 0, . . . , 0). Thus we can write
Volk(PK) = det(S|E)Volk(PTK) =
1∏k
i=1 λi
Volk(PTK) . 
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Before we can finish our discussion, we will need the fact that the isotropic constant of K can
be expressed in terms of the determinant of MK .
Fact 7.6 ([Gia03, MP89]). Let K ⊆ <d be a convex body of unit volume. Then,
L2KVol(K)
2
d = det(MK)1/d. (14)
Moreover, K is in isotropic position iff MK = L2KVol(K)
2/dI.
We conclude with the following Proposition 7.7.
Proposition 7.7. Let K ⊆ <d be a symmetric convex body. Let Mk have eigenvectors u1, . . . , ud
with eigenvalues σ1, . . . , σd. Let 1 6 k 6 dd2e with and suppose E = span{u1, u2, . . . , uk}, Denote by
P be the projection operator onto the subspace E. Then,
Volk(PK)1/(d−k) > Ω(1) · αK
(
k∏
i=1
σ
1/2
i
)1/(d−k)
, (15)
where αK is Ω(1/d
1
4 ). Moreover, assuming the Hyperplane conjecture, αK > Ω(1).
Proof. Consider the linear mapping T = M−
1/2
K . this is well defined since MK is a positive symmetric
matrix. It is easy to see that after applying T , we have MTK = I. Hence, by Fact 7.6, TK is in
isotropic position and has volume Vol(TK)1/d = 1/LTK = 1/LK , since det(MTK) = 1. Scaling TK
by λ = L1/dK hence results in Vol(λTK) = 1. Noting that λT has eigenvalues λσ
− 1
2
1 , λσ
− 1
2
2 , . . . , λσ
− 1
2
d ,
we can apply Lemma 7.5 and get
Volk(PK) > Volk(PλTK)
k∏
i=1
√
σi
λ
Since λTK is in isotropic position and has unit volume, Corollary 7.4 implies that
Volk(PλTK)1/(d−k) > αK . (16)
Thus the required inequality holds with an additional λ−
k
d−k term. By assumption on k, kd−k is at
most 2. Moreover, λ = L1/dK 6 d1/d 6 2, so that this additional term is a constant. As discussed
above, αK is Ω(d−
1
4 ) by [Kla06], and Ω(1) assuming the Hyperplane Conjecture 6.3. Hence the
claim. 
7.3 Arguing near optimality of our mechanism
Our next lemma shows that the expected squared Euclidean error added by our algorithm in each
step is bounded by the square of the optimum. We will first need the following fact.
Fact 7.8. Let K ⊆ <d be a centered convex body. Let σ1 > σ2 > . . . > σd denote the eigenvalues of
MK with a corresponding orthonormal eigenbasis u1, . . . , ud. Then, for all 1 6 i 6 d,
σi = max
θ
E
x∈K
〈θ, x〉2 (17)
where the maximum runs over all θ ∈ Sd−1 such that θ is orthogonal to u1, u2, . . . , ui−1.
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Lemma 7.9. Let a denote the random variable returned by the K-norm mechanism in step (3) in
the above description of NIM(F, d, ε). Then,
GVolLB(F, ε)2 > Ω(α2K)E ‖PV a‖22 .
Proof. For simplicity, we will assume that d is even and hence d − d′ = d′. The analysis of the
K-norm mechanism (Theorem 4.3 with p = 2) shows that the random variable a returned by the
K-norm mechanism in step (3) satisfies
E ‖PV a‖22 =
Γ(d+ 3)
ε2Γ(d+ 1)
=
(d+ 2)(d+ 1)
ε2
E
z∈K
‖PV z‖22
= O
(
d2
ε2
) d∑
i=d′+1
E
z∈K
〈z, ui〉2
= O
(
d2
ε2
) d∑
i=d′+1
σi (by Fact 7.8)
6 O
(
d3
ε2
)
· σd′+1. (18)
On the other hand, by the definition of GVolLB,
GVolLB(F, ε)2 > Ω
(
d3
ε2
)
·Vold′(PUK)2/d′
> Ω
(
d3
ε2
)
α2K
(
d′∏
i=1
σi
)1/d′
(by Proposition 7.7)
> Ω
(
d3
ε2
)
α2Kσd′ .
Since σd′ > σd′+1, it follows that
GVolLB(F, ε)2 > Ω(α2K)E ‖PV a‖2 . (19)
The case of odd d is similar except that we define K ′ to be the projection onto the first d′ + 1
eigenvectors. 
Lemma 7.10. Assume the hyperplane conjecture. Then, the `2-error of the mechanism NIM(F, d, ε)
satisfies
err(NIM, F ) 6 O(
√
log(d) ·GVolLB(F, ε)).
Proof. We have to sum up the error over all recursive calls of the mechanism. To this end, let
PVmam denote the output of the K-norm mechanism am in step m projected to the corresponding
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subspace Vm. Also, let a ∈ <d denote the final output of our mechanism. We then have,
E ‖a‖2 6
√
E ‖a‖22 (Jensen’s inequality)
=
√√√√ log d∑
m=1
E ‖PVmam‖22
6
√√√√ log d∑
m=1
O(α−2Km) ·GVolLB(F, ε)2 (by Lemma 7.10)
6 O(
√
log d)
(
max
m
α−1Km
)
GVolLB(F, ε).
Here we have used the fact that GVolLB(F, ε) > GVolLB(PUF, ε). Finally, the hyperplane conjecture
implies maxm α−1Km = O(1). 
Corollary 7.11. Let ε > 0. Suppose F : <n → <d is a linear map. Further, assume the hyperplane
conjecture. Then, there is an ε-differentially private mechanism M with error
err(M,F ) 6 O(log(d)3/2 ·GVolLB(F, ε)).
Proof. The mechanism NIM(F, d, ε/ log(d)) satisfies ε-differential privacy, by Lemma 7.2. The error
is at most log(d)
√
log d ·GVolLB(F, ε) as a direct consequence of Lemma 7.10. 
Thus our lower bound GVolLB and the mechanism NIM are both within O(log3/2 d) of the
optimum.
8 Efficient implementation of our mechanism
We will first describe how to implement our mechanism in the case where K is isotropic. Recall that
we first sample R ∼ Gamma(d, ε−1) and then sample a point a uniformly at random from RK. The
first step poses no difficulty. Indeed when U1, . . . , Ud are independently distributed uniformly over
the interval (0, 1], then a standard fact tells us that ε−1
∑d
i=1− ln(Ui) ∼ Gamma(d, ε−1). Sampling
uniformly from K on the other hand may be hard. However, there are ways of sampling nearly
uniform points from K using various types of rapidly mixing random walks. In this section, we will
use the Grid Walk for simplicity even though there are more efficient walks that will work for us.
We refer the reader to the survey of Vempala [Vem05] or the original paper of Dyer, Frieze and
Kannan [DFK91] for a description of the Grid walk and background information. Informally, the
Grid walk samples nearly uniformly from a grid inside K, i.e., L ∩K where we take L = 1
d2
Zd. The
Grid Walk poses two requirements on K:
1. Membership in K can be decided efficiently.
2. K is bounded, in the sense that Bd2 ⊆ K ⊆ dBd2 .
Both conditions are naturally satisfied in our case where K = FBn1 for some F ∈ [−1, 1]d×n.
Indeed, K ⊆ Bd∞ ⊆
√
dBd2 and we may always assume that B
d
2 ⊆ K, for instance, by considering
K ′ = K + Bd2 rather than K. This will only increase the noise level by 1 in Euclidean distance.
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Notice that K ′ is convex. In order to implement the membership oracle for K, we need to be
able to decide for a given a ∈ <d, whether there exists an x ∈ Bn1 such that Fx = a. These
constraints can be encoded using a linear program. In the case of K ′ this can be done using convex
programming [GLS94].
The mixing time of the Grid walk is usually quantified in terms of the total variation (or L1)
distance between the random walk and its stationary distribution. The stationary distribution of
the grid Walk is the uniform distribution over L ∩K. Standard arguments show that an L1-bound
gives us δ-approximate ε-differential privacy where δ can be made exponentially small in polynomial
time. In order to get exact privacy (δ = 0) we instead need a multiplicative guarantee on the density
of the random walk at each point in K.
In Appendix A, we show that the Grid Walk actually satisfies mixing bounds in the relative
L∞-metric which gives us the following theorem. We also need to take care of the fact that the
stationary distribution is a priori not uniform over K. A solution to this problem is shown in the
appendix as well.
Theorem 8.1. Let Pt denote the Grid Walk over K at time step t. Given a linear mapping
F : <n → <d and x ∈ <n, consider the mechanism M ′ which samples R ∼ Gamma(d+ 1, ε−1) and
then outputs Ra where a ∼ Pt. Then, there is some t 6 poly(d, ε−1) such that
1. M ′ is O(ε)-differentially private,
2. err(M ′, F ) = err(M,F ) +O(1), where M denotes the K-norm mechanism.
We conclude that the Grid walk gives us an efficient implementation of our mechanism which
achieves the same error bound (up to constants) and ε-differential privacy.
Remark 8.2. The runtime stated in Theorem 8.1 depends only upon d and ε−1. The polynomial
dependence on n only comes in when implementing the separation oracle for K as described earlier.
Since we think of d as small compared to n, the exact runtime of our algorithm heavily depends
upon how efficiently we can implement the separation oracle.
8.1 When K is not isotropic
In the non-isotropic case we additionally need to compute the subspaces U and V to project onto
(Step 2 of the algorithm). Note that these subspaces themselves depend only on the query F and
not on the database x. Thus these can be published and the mechanism maintains its privacy for an
arbitrary choice of subspaces U and V . The choice of U, V in Section 7 depended on the covariance
matrix M , which we do not know how to compute exactly. We next describe a method to choose
U and V that is efficient such that the resulting mechanism has essentially the same error. The
sampling from K can then be replaced by approximate sampling as in the previous subsection,
resulting in a polynomial-time differentially private mechanism with small error.
Without loss of generality, K has the property that Bd2 ⊆ K ⊆ d2Bd2 . In this case, xixj 6 d4
so that with O(d4 log d) (approximately uniform) samples from K, Chernoff bounds imply that
the sample covariance matrix approximates the covariance matrix well. In other words, we can
construct a matrix M˜K such that each entry of M˜K is within neg(d) of the corresponding entry in
MK . Here and in the rest of the section, neg(d) denotes an negligible function bounded above by
1
dC
for a large enough constant C, where the constant may vary from one use to the next. Let the
eigenvalues of M˜ be σ˜1, . . . , σ˜d with corresponding eigenvectors u˜1, . . . , u˜d. Let T˜ be the M˜
− 1
2
K , and
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let P˜ be the projection operator onto the span of the first d′ eigenvectors of M˜K . This defines our
subspaces U˜ and V˜ , and hence the mechanism. We next argue that Lemma 7.10 continues to hold.
First note that for any i > d′ + 1
E
a∈K
〈a, u˜i〉2 = ‖u˜Ti MK u˜i‖
= ‖u˜Ti M˜K u˜i‖+ ‖u˜Ti (MK − M˜K)u˜i‖
= σ˜i + neg(d).
Thus, Equation 18 continues to hold with σ˜d′+1 replacing σd′+1.
To prove that Proposition 7.7 continues to hold (with M˜, T˜ , P˜ replacing M,T, P ), we note that
the only place in the proof that we used that MK is in fact the covariance matrix of K is (16),
when we require TK to be isotropic. We next argue that (16) holds for T˜K if M˜K is a good enough
approximation to MK . This would imply Proposition 7.7 and hence the result.
First recall that Wedin’s theorem [Wed72] states that for non-singular matrices R, R˜,
‖R−1 − R˜−1‖2 6 1 +
√
5
2
‖R− R˜‖2 ·max{‖R−1‖22, ‖R˜−1‖22} .
Using this for the matrices M
1
2 , M˜
1
2 and using standard perturbation bounds gives (see e.g. [KM08]):
‖T˜ − T‖2 6 O(1)‖T‖22 · ‖M˜
1
2
K −M
1
2
K‖2 . (20)
Since ‖T‖2 is at most poly(d) and the second term is neg(d), we conclude that ‖T˜ − T‖2 is neg(d).
It follows that TK ⊆ T˜K + neg(d)Bd2 . Moreover, since TK is in isotropic position, it contains a
ball 1dB
d
2 . It follows from Lemma C.1 in the appendix that
1
2dB
d
2 is contained in T˜K. Thus,(
1− 1d
)
TK ⊆ (1− 1d) T˜K + neg(d)Bd2
⊆ (1− 1d) T˜K + neg(d)T˜K
⊆ T˜K ,
where the last containment follows from the fact that T˜K is convex and contains the origin. Thus
(1− 1d)P˜ TK ⊆ P˜ T˜K. Since Corollary 3.4 still lower bounds the volume of P˜ TK, we conclude that
Volk(P˜ T˜K)1/k >
1
e
Volk(P˜ TK)1/k >
α
d−k
k
K
e
,
where we have used the fact that k 6 d so that (1 − 1d)k > 1e . For k = d′, d−kk is Θ(1) so
that Volk(P˜ T˜K)1/(d−k) > Ω(αK). Thus we have shown that up to constants, (16) holds for
Volk(P˜ T˜K)1/(d−k) which completes the proof.
9 Generalizations of our mechanism
Previously, we studied linear mappings F : <n → <d where <n was endowed with the `1-metric.
However, the K-norm mechanism is well-defined in a much more general context. The only property
of K used here is its convexity. In general, let D be an arbitrary domain of databases with a distance
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function dist . Given a function F : D → <d, we could define K0 = {(F (x) − F (x′))/dist(x, x′) :
x, x′ ∈ D} and let K be the convex closure of K0. Then the K-norm mechanism can be seen to
be differentially private with respect to dist . Indeed note that that |q(d, a) − q(d′, a)| = |F (d) −
a|K − |F (d′)− a|K 6 |F (d)− F (d′)|K 6 dist(d, d′), and thus privacy follows from the exponential
mechanism.
Moreover, in cases when one does not have a good handle on K itself, one can use any convex
body K ′ containing K.
Databases close in `2-norm. For example, McSherry and Mironov [MM09] can transform their
input data set so that neighboring databases map to points within Euclidean distance at most R for
a suitable parameter R. Thus dist here is the `2 norm and for any linear query, K is an ellipsoid.
Local Sensitivity. Nissim, Raskhodnikova and Smith [NRS07] define smooth sensitivity and show
that one can design approximately differentially private mechanism that add noise proportional to
the smooth sensitivity of the query. This can be significant improvement when the local sensitivity
is much smaller than the global sensitivity. Notice that such queries are necessarily non-linear. We
point out that one can define a local sensitivity analogue of the K-norm mechanism by considering
the polytopes Kx = conv
{
F (x′)−F (x)
dist(x,x′) : x
′ ∈ D
}
and adapting the techniques of [NRS07] accordingly.
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A Mixing times of the Grid Walk in L∞
In this section, we sketch the proof of Theorem 8.1. We will be interested in the mixing properties
of Markov chains over some measured state space Ω. We will need to compare probability measures
µ, ν over the space Ω.
The relative L∞-distance is defined as
‖µ/ν − 1‖∞ = sup
u∈Ω
∣∣∣∣dµ(u)dν(u) − 1
∣∣∣∣ . (21)
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For a Markov chain P , we will be interested in the mixing time in the ∞-metric. That is the
smallest number t such that ‖Pt/pi − 1‖∞ 6 ε. Here, Pt is the distribution of P at step t and pi
denotes the stationary distribution of P. The relevance of the ∞-norm for our purposes is given by
the following fact.
Lemma A.1. Suppose M = {µx}x∈<n is an ε-differentially private mechanism M and suppose
M ′ = {µ′x}x∈<n satisfies max{‖µx/µ′x−1‖∞, ‖µ′x/µx−1‖∞} 6 ε for some 0 6 ε 6 1 and all x ∈ <n.
Then, M ′ is 3ε-differentially private.
Proof. By our second assumption,
max
{
dµx(u)
dµ′x(u)
,
dµ′x(u)
dµx(u)
}
6 1 + ε 6 eε.
where we used that 1 + ε 6 eε for 0 6 ε 6 1.
Now, let x, x′ satisfy ‖x− x′‖1 6 1. By the previous inequality, we have
sup
u∈Ω
dµ′x(u)
dµ′x′(u)
6 sup
u∈Ω
dµx(u)eε
dµx′(u)e−ε
6 e2ε sup
u∈Ω
dµx(u)
dµx′(u)
6 e3ε.
In the last inequality, we used the assumption that M is ε-differentially private. Hence, we have
shown that M ′ is 3ε-differentially private. 
Now consider the grid walk with a fine enough grid (say side length β). It is known that a
random walk on a grid gets within statistical distance at most ∆ of the uniform distribution in time
that is polynomial in d, β−1 and log ∆−1. Setting ∆ to be smaller than the ε(β/d)d, we end up with
a distribution that is within `∞ distance at most ε from the uniform distribution on the grid points
in K. Let zˆ be a sample from the grid walk, and let z be a random point from an `∞ ball of radius
half the side length of the grid, centered at zˆ. Then z is a (nearly) uniform sample from a body K˜
which has the property that (1− β)K ⊆ K˜ ⊆ (1 + β)K.
A.1 Weak separation oracle
An η-weak separation oracle for K ′ is a blackbox that says ‘YES’ when given u ∈ <d with
(u+ ηBd2) ⊆ K ′ and outputs ‘NO’ when u 6∈ K ′ + ηBd2 . Here, η > 0 is some parameter that we can
typically make arbitrarily small, with the running time depending on η−1. Our previous discussion
assumed an oracle for which η = 0. Taking η = β ensures that the sample above is (nearly) uniform
from a body Kˆ such that (1− 2β)K ⊆ K˜ ⊆ (1 + 2β)K. By rescaling, we get the following lemma.
Lemma A.2. Let K be a convex body such that Bd2 ⊆ K ⊆ dBd2 , and let β > 0. Suppose K is
represented by a β-weak separation oracle. Then, there is a randomized algorithm Sample(K,β)
running in time poly(d, β−1) whose output distribution is within `∞-distance at most β from the
uniform distribution over a body Kˆ such that K ⊆ Kˆ ⊆ (1 + β)K.
We now argue that such a (nearly) uniform sample from a body close enough to K suffices
for the privacy guarantee. Our algorithm first samples r ∼ Gamma(d+ 1, ε−1), and then outputs
Fx+ rz where z is the output of Sample(K,β) for β = min(ε/d, 1/r).
We can repeat the calculation for the density at a point a in equation (6). Indeed for a point a
with ‖a− Fx‖K = R, the density at a conditioned on a sample r from the Gamma distribution, is
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(1±β)/Vol(rKˆ) whenever (a/r) ∈ Kˆ, and zero otherwise. By our choice of β, Vol(Kˆ) = (1±ε)Vol(K).
Moreover (a/r) ∈ Kˆ for r > R and (a/r) 6∈ Kˆ for r < R/(1 + β). Thus the density at a is
g(a) > 1± (ε+ β)
ε−dΓ(d+ 1)
∫ ∞
R
e−εttd
Vol(tK)
dt =
(1± (ε+ β)) ∫∞R e−εtdt
Γ(d+ 1)Vol(ε−1K)
=
(1± (ε+ β))e−εR
Γ(d+ 1)Vol(ε−1K)
.
Similarly, (a/r) 6∈ Kˆ for r < R/(1 + β) implies that g(a) 6 (1±(ε+β))e−εR/(1+β)
Γ(d+1)Vol(ε−1K) . It follows that g(a)
is within an exp(O(ε)) factor of the ideal density.
Finally, the bound on the moments of the Gamma distribution from Fact 2.10 implies that the
expected running time of this algorithm is polynomial in d, ε−1.
B Lower bounds for Differential Privacy with respect to Hamming
Distance
While our lower bounds were proved for differential privacy in the `1-metric, the usual notion
of differential privacy uses Hamming distance instead. In this section we argue that for small
enough ε, our lower bounds can be extended to the usual definition. Let the database be a vector
w ∈ [n]N where each individual has a private value in [n]. Such a database can be transformed
to its histogram x = x(w) ∈ Zn+ where xi(w) denotes the number of inputs that take value i, i.e.
xi(w) = |{j : wj = i}|. A linear query F on the histogram is a sensitivity 1 query on the database
w, and a mechanism M is ε-differentially private with respect to the Hamming distance on w, if
and only if it is differentially private with respect to the `1 norm, when restricted to non-negative
integer vectors x.
We can then repeat the proof of theorem 3.3, with minor modifications to handle the non-negative
integer constraint.
Theorem B.1. Let ε > 0 and suppose F ∈ {−1, 1}d×n is a linear map and let K = FBn1 . Then,
every ε-differentially private mechanism M for computing G(w) = Fx(w) must have
err(M,G) > Ω(VolLB(F, ε)), (22)
whenever ε < cdVol(K)1/d/
√
n, for a universal constant c.
Proof. Let R = Vol(K)1/d. By Fact 3.2 and our assumption, (d/4ε)K = F ((d/4ε)Bn1 ) contains an
CRd
√
d/4ε-packing Y ⊆ <d of size at least exp(d), for some constant C. Let X ⊆ (d/4ε)Bn1 be a
set of arbitrarily chosen preimages of y ∈ Y so that |X| = |Y | and FX = Y .
Now we come up with a similar set X ′ ∈ Zn+. For each x ∈ X, we round each xi randomly up
or down, i.e. xˆi = dxie, with probability (xi − bxic), and bxic otherwise. It is easy to check that
E[xˆ] = x. so that with probability 2/3, |xˆ|1 6 3|x|1. Moreover, E[Fxˆ] = Fx and each random
choice can change ‖Fxˆ‖ by at most √d. Thus martingale concentration results imply that with
probability 2/3, ‖Fxˆ − Fx‖ 6 2√dn. Thus there exists a choice of xˆ so that both these events
happen. Let v denote the vector (dd/2εe, dd/2εe, . . . , dd/2εe) and set x′ = xˆ+v. This defines our set
X ′ which is easily seen to be in Zn+. In fact, X ′ ⊆ v + (dd/2εe)Bn1 . Moreover, for ε < CRd/32
√
n,
FX ′ is a CRd
√
d/8ε-packing.
Now assume that M = {µx : x ∈ <n} is an ε-differentially private mechanism with error
CRd
√
d/32ε and lead this to a contradiction. By the assumption on the error, Markov’s inequality
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implies that for all x ∈ X ′, µx(Bx) > 12 , where Bx is a ball of radius CRd
√
d/16ε centered at Fx.
By the packing property above, the balls {Bx : x ∈ X} are disjoint.
Since ‖x′ − v‖1 6 (d/2ε), it follows from ε-differential privacy with Fact 2.3 that
µv(Bx) > exp(−ε(d/2ε))µx(Bx) > 12 exp(−d/2).
Since the balls Bx are pairwise disjoint,
1 > µ0(∪x∈XBx) =
∑
x∈X
µ0(Bx) > exp(d)12 exp(−d/2) > 1 (23)
for d > 2. We have thus obtained a contradiction. 
Translating the lower bound from Theorem 5.2 to this setting, we get
Theorem B.2. Let ε ∈ (0, (c√(d/n)) · min{√d,√log(n/d)}) for a universal constant c and let
d 6 log n. Then there exists a linear map F ∈ {−1, 1}d×n such that every ε-differentially private
mechanism M for computing G(w) = Fx(w) must have
err(M,G) > Ω(d/ε) ·min{
√
d,
√
log(n/d)}. (24)
We remark that this lower bound holds for N = Ω(nd/ε).
C Dilated Ball containment
Lemma C.1. Let A be a convex body in <d such that Bd2 ⊆ A + rBd2 for some r < 1. Then a
dilation (1− r)Bd2 is contained in A.
Proof. Let z ∈ <d be a unit vector. Suppose that z′ = (1 − r)z 6∈ A. Then by the Separating
Hyperplane theorem (see, e.g., [BV04]), there is a hyperplane H separating z′ from A. Thus there
is a unit vector w and a scalar b such that 〈z′, w〉 − b = 0 and 〈u,w〉 − b 6 0 for all u ∈ A. Let
v = z′ + rw. Then by triangle inequality, ‖v‖ 6 1. Moreover,
d(v,A) = inf
u∈A
‖u− v‖ > inf
u∈A
〈v − u,w〉 > b+ r − sup
u∈A
〈u,w〉 > r.
This however contradicts the assumption that that v ∈ Bd2 ⊆ A+ rBd2 . Since z was arbitrary, the
lemma is proved. 
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